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Abstract
Fictitious play with reinforcement learning is a general and effective framework for zero-
sum games. However, using the current deep neural network models, the implementation
of fictitious play faces crucial challenges. Neural network model training employs gradi-
ent descent approaches to update all connection weights, and thus is easy to forget the old
opponents after training to beat the new opponents. Existing approaches often maintain a
pool of historical policy models to avoid the forgetting. However, learning to beat a pool in
stochastic games, i.e., a wide distribution over policy models, is either sample-consuming
or insufficient to exploit all models with limited amount of samples. In this paper, we pro-
pose a learning process with neural fictitious play to alleviate the above issues. We train a
single model as our policy model, which consists of sub-models and a selector. Everytime
facing a new opponent, the model is expanded by adding a new sub-model, where only the
new sub-model is updated instead of the whole model. At the same time, the selector is
also updated to mix up the new sub-model with the previous ones at the state-level, so that
the model is maintained as a behavior strategy instead of a wide distribution over policy
models. Experiments on Kuhn poker, a grid-world Treasure Hunting game, and Mini-RTS
environments show that the proposed approach alleviates the forgetting problem, and con-
sequently improves the learning efficiency and the robustness of neural fictitious play.
1 Introduction
Many multi-agent systems can be modelled by games with incomplete information, where play-
ers have only partial observations of the system states and take actions based on these observa-
tions. Usually, the goal of each player is to maximize their expected payoff locally. However, it
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is intractable to obtain a closed-form solution based on linear programming or some search tech-
niques as the observation or action space increases. An alternative approach is learning in games
where the player learns a strategy through playing the game. Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) was
a famous learning framework in games. In each iteration of fictitious play, the player makes a
best response ccording to their belief about the other players’ strategies, repeatedly plays the
game and averages these best responses. In specific games, the average strategy profile can be
shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium.
There are many variants of standard fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998), but most
of them focus on normal-form representations and cannot be readily applied in large-scale
games. On the other hand, although reinforcement learning (RL) is an efficient approach to
solve large-scale single-agent sequential decision-making problems, vanilla independent rein-
forcement learning often fails in multi-agent scenarios with new challenges mainly from two
aspects: instability and adaptability (Busoniu et al., 2008). The simultaneously indepent learn-
ing process makes the learning dynamics of every agent instable, and the learning agent must
adapt to the changing behaviors of other agents. To our knowledge, FSP (Heinrich et al., 2015)
was the first to successfully apply fictitious play in large-scale imperfect-information extensive-
form games with a general machine learning framework, without any explicit knowledge about
the opponents or the game. In FSP, RL was used for solving best response, and the average strat-
egy was learned by supervised learning from best response experiences. An improved version
with neural networks named NFSP (Heinrich and Silver, 2016) was also proposed.
Despite the success of reinforcement learning in games, there are crucial issues with current
deep RL techniques that need to be solved. Avoiding forgetting the best responses to old oppo-
nents is essential when competing with a possibly dynamic opponent, e.g., an opponent that also
learns. However, the most frequently used neural function approximations are easy to overfit to
the current opponent and have an unknown effect on previously well-trained weights due to the
back-propagation updates. Existing approaches try to finalize these trained policy models, i.e.,
maintain a pool of historical policy models and a distribution over these models.
In this paper, we focus on decentralized learning in partially observable environments, and
propose a fictitious play reinforcement learning framework with expanding models named
FPEM to address the above issues. In every iteration, the FPEM expands with a sub-model,
which is also a neural network policy that is a best response to the opponent. Then a policy se-
lector network mixes all these sub-models, updates during training and chooses a sub-model at
every state. Intuitively speaking, these sub-models act as base policies and try to handle diverse
malicious opponents, while the selector network handles in an upper level to choose a better
candidate base policy at every state.
Related Works. CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2007) appeared to be the first tractable approach
for finding the Nash equilibrium in large-scale imperfect-information extensive-form games
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through learning in games. CFR and its variants, such as CFR+ (Tammelin, 2014), linear CFR
(Brown and Sandholm), performed well in practice. CFR-based approaches usually need to
traverse the game tree to reason about every state and require some knowledge to abstract the
game. Recently, Deep CFR (Brown et al., 2019) was also proposed to obviate the need for
abstratction and using neural networks to deal with large games and comparable to linear CFR.
Deepstack (Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017) also incorporated reinforcement learning, and was capable
of beating professional poker players at heads-up no-limit Texas hold’em poker based on CFR.
Double Oracle (DO) algorithm (McMahan et al., 2003) maintained two deterministic policy
pool in two-player games and assumed each player is restricted to select from their policy
pool, then DO algorithm iteratively found an optimal pure strategy for each player against its
opponents and added them to the two pools. Policy space response oracle (PSRO) (Lanctot et al.,
2017) generalized DO, where the meta-game’s choices are policies rather than pure policies.
The PSRO then learns the combination model (meta-strategy) of the oracles from the expected
utility tensor computed via simulations. Based on the learning objective of meta-strategy, PSRO
can be instances of independent RL, FP and DO. Functional-form games and gamespaces were
proposed to construct a sequence of objectives (Balduzzi et al., 2019) and a rectified RSPO
algorithm was also proposed.
To balance the performance of learning agents in two-player stochastic games, soft Q-
learning was applied with a uniform distribution regularization term, to design games with
adaptable and balancing properties tailored to human-level performance (Grau-Moya et al.,
2018). Previous work (Pe´rolat et al., 2018) built a stochastic approximation of the fictitious play
process in an online, decentralized fashion and applied it to multistage games, where the best
response model chooses an action to maximize a perturbed Q function. In partially observable
multi-agent environments, the actor-critic framework with several policy update rules based on
regret minimization can lead to previously unknown convergence guarantees (Srinivasan et al.,
2018) in such environments. An variant of NFSP is applied to an RTS game, replacing the best
response solver with PPO (Kawamura and Tsuruoka, 2019), and the authors launched multiple
processes to reduce off-policy data. Exploitability Descend (Lockhart et al., 2019) computed a
best response and then performed exploitability descend directly on the policy to increase the
utility, without having to compute an explicit average policy.
Contributions. We note that the previous works either used one single fixed structure policy
model (usually a neural network) as an average strategy and updated on that model or main-
tained a popopulation of policies (policy pool), evolved the pool and updated the sampling
distribution over the population, based on the fitness/performance of policies in the population.
Our major contributions are that we propose an expanding policy model that consists of multiple
trained sub-models, and can be used as a behavior strategy, stabilizing the performance against
the old opponents and also adapting to the new opponents. Combined with the opponent pool,
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the FPEM alleviates the forgetting problem and continually incorporates a newly trained base
policy to form a new mixed model. The selector network learns from the specified distribution
over these sub-models and the newly added sub-model learns to adapt to the opponent. Since
the policy selector is a behavior policy, it is able to adjust base policies during one game and
achieve more stable performance than sampling a policy for the whole game from the policy
pool, although both approaches can achieve the same long-term utility in expectation. Besides,
the FPEM model with a maximum number of base policies is more flexible and excels when
compared with a single policy network with more parameters.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Reinforcement learning
In reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 2018), an agent interacts with the environ-
ment, i.e., takes an action and receives a state or observation and reward signal from the en-
vironment at each timestep. The goal of the RL agent is to learn an optimal policy that max-
imizes the expected cumulative rewards, i.e., the return in the long run for the agent from in-
teracting trajectories. RL can be formalized as a Markov decision process (MDP). Formally,
an MDP is defined as a 5-tuple 〈S,A, P, r, γ〉 where the state space is S, with the action space
A, and P : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the state transition function. Namely, when the agent takes
action at in state st, it transitions to a new state st+1 ∼ P (st+1|st, at) and gets the reward
signal r : S × A → R. The last term γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor that trades off the
current and future rewards. The agent’s policy is a probability distribution over state–action
space pi : S × A → [0, 1] satisfying ∑a∈A pi(s, a) = 1. The state value function V and state–
action value function Q is defined by V pi(s) = Epi[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)|s0 = s] and Qpi(s, a) =
Epi[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)|s0 = s, a0 = a]. With the notation of value function V , the goal of RL
can be formulated as pi?(s, a) = argmaxpi V pi(s) = argmaxpi Epi[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)|s0 = s]. In
partially observable environments, the agent receives only a partial observation ot of the sys-
tem state, and to circumvent the belief state in POMDP, the agent’s policy maps a state-action
history sequenece ht = (o1, a1, · · · , ot) in that episode to the probability distribution over the
action space. In this paper, because we focus on decentralized control, we always use st to de-
note the input of the policy model when it is clear from the context, instead of alternating to ot
or ht.
2.2 Stochastic Game
Stochastic games (also known as Markov games) (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008) generalize
both Markov decision processes and repeated games. In repeated games, a given game (often in
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normal form) is played multiple times by the same set of players. With a little abuse of notation,
a stochastic game is represented as a 6-tuple 〈S,N,A, P, r, γ〉 where S is the state space and N
is a finite set of players. A = A1×· · ·×AN is the joint action space where Ai denotes the set of
actions for player i. P : S ×A× S → [0, 1] is the state transition function. P (st+1|st, at) is the
probability of the transition from state st to state st+1 after joint action at. The payoff function
r = (r1, · · · , rN), where ri : S × A → R, is real-valued for player i. A history ht of the game
is a finite sequence ht = (s1, a1, · · · , st) ∈ H . Superscript is used to denote which player is, a
player’s behavior strategy (the agent’s policy) is defined as pii : H × Ai → [0, 1]|Ai|, and their
strategy profile (joint policy) is pi = pi1×· · ·×piN . Denoting all of the players expect player i by
−i, the strategy profile can be simplified to pi = pii × pi−i. A pure strategy of a player i assigns
all probability on a single actoin for each history ht, i.e., pii : H → A. A mixed strategy of the
player is a probability distribution over all possible pure strategies. By Kuhns theorem, it can
be shown that a mixed strategy is always equivalent to a behavior strategy and vice versa, given
perfect recall, which means that every player will not forget what they have done or observed
in one episode. It is clear that perfect recall always holds if players make decesions in a history
ht. A Markov strategy is a behavior strategy with Markov, i.e., property pii(ht, at) = pii(st, at).
Analogously, γ is the discount factor.
The expected cumulative reward for player i is formulated as V pi,i(s) = Epi[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tri(st, at)|s0 =
s] where pi = (pii, pi−i). A best response pii,? ∈ BR(pi−i) = argmaxpii V pi,i(s), is a policy that
achieves the highest expected cumulative payoff when pi−i keeps fixed. Nash equilibrium is a
strategy profile pi = (pii, pi−i) where ∀i, pii ∈ BR(pi−i), so that no player can improve their
payoff by deviating from it unilaterally. If ∀i, V i,(BR(pi−i),pi−i) − V i,pi ≤ δ, pi yields a δ-Nash
equilibrium. The discounted-reward case is the less problematic: a Nash equilibrium exists in
every stochastic game, as shown by folk theorem.
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, r1(st, at) + r2(st, at) = 0 always holds true, and
the expected cumulative reward of the opponent is V pi,−i(s) = −V pi,i(s). It can be obtained
from the definition that maxpii minpi−i V i(s) ≤ minpi−i maxpii V i(s). The underlying property
of a maximin strategy is straight-forward: it guarantees the worst-case payoff when faced with
an adversarial player. By minimax theorem, in two-player zero-sum games, the maximin value
is equal to the minimax value and is called the value of the game. It can be shown that every
Nash equilibrium achieves the same unique value V in two-player zero-sum games, and the
Nash equilibrium is a maximin strategy.
In the remainder of this paper, we do not distinguish between the player and the agent,
which are essentially the same, nor do the strategy and the policy or the payoff and the reward.
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(b) Opponent’s Policy model
Figure 1: Two policy generating approaches for the max player (player 1) and the min player
(player 2). Each circle is a base policy which receives a history h as its input and so does the
policy selectorW . As (a) shows, the max player’s policy consists of two components: the policy
selector and a base policy set. In iteration t, a new base policy is trained against the opponent
pool and added to base policy set. Every iteration, the opponent trains a single policy pi−it that
tries to beat the FPEM model and is also added to the opponent pool after training.
3 Fictitious Play with Expanding Models
In two-player zero-sum games, the decentralized fashion of solving for maximum expected
utility is equivalent to solving the maximin strategy of the player, since the maximum for the
opponent is the minimum for the player. Thus, the objective function can be represented as
pii,? = argmax
pii
min
pi−i
V pi,i(s). (1)
This problem can be solved by alternative optimization approaches. However, in complex
environments, it is impossible to derive the closed-form solution for the max or min operator,
albeit V (s) is well formulated. It should be noticed that all the other players’ strategies remain
fixed during the max or min step when alternative optimization is used. Thus, the max or min
optimization problem is reduced to a standard single-agent RL problem with new transition
function composed of the environment dynamics and the other players’ policy. We use neural
networks as function approximators to represent the players’ policies and value functions. By
denoting player i’s and −i’s parameterized policies as piiθ, pi−iθ respectively, the new objectives
can be represented as
θi,? = argmax
θi
min
θ−i
V (pi
i
θ,pi
−i
θ ),i(s). (2)
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θ−i,? = argmin
θ−i
max
θi
V (pi
i
θ,pi
−i
θ ),i(s). (3)
We assume that the opponent is a malicious adversary that always tries to minimize the
expected return V pi(s) to approximate the maximin process. Without loss of generality, we also
assume that player 1 is the max player, and player 2 is the min player.
3.1 Alternative Optimization with Single Model
The players’ policies are both represented by neural networks so that the extremum operator
can be approximately solved with deep reinforcement learning techniques, and alternative opti-
mization can be readily applied. In the max or min step, the corresponding player tries to solve
for the optimal policy when the opponent’s policy is fixed by updating the parameters. Since a
neural network is used as the function approximator and the extremum operation is coupled with
the opponent’s policy, the underlying problem is instability. As the training process continues,
the current trained policy is no longer a best response or even loses when playing against some
opponents that used to be defeated, namely, forgetting old opponents. So the training process
may fluctuate or even diverge, especially in cases where the opponent’s policy is crucial. The
instability here is inherent in the policy model due to back-propagation updating.
In independent RL, because the unawareness of the other players and simultaneous learning,
the dynamics of the environment is much more complex and induces the instability, irrespective
of what policy model is used.
3.2 Opponent Pool with Single Model
To stabilize the training process, i.e., to guarantee the performance when facing defeated oppo-
nents, instead of competing with a single policy model, the opponent’s historical policies are
kept in a buffer, which is known as the opponent pool. AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2016) also used an
opponent pool to stabilize training by preventing overfitting to the current policy being trained.
It added the current policy to the opponent pool every 500 iterations and samples a policy to
compete within each iteration (a mini-batch of n games).
In this paper, we add an opponent policy to the pool after every min iteration and uniformly
sample a policy for each game from the pool. The max player trains the current policy to maxi-
mize the expected return against the mixture of policies from the opponent pool. The opponent’s
policy pi−it that is added to the pool is a best response to the max player’s policy piit, which tracks
the process of Brown’s original fictitious play. Because all of the opponent’s policies are kept
and form a mixture model of policies, this helps to alleviate the problem of forgetting so that
the performance will not have a sudden drop when facing a defeated opponent. For simplicity
and to adhere to fictitious play, we just uniformly sample from the opponent pool. However,
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some other distributions can be used in practice, e.g., a distribution that is proportional to the
ranking of the opponent’s policies (OpenAI, 2018; Vinyals et al., 2019). The opponent pool can
be treated as a mixed strategy, as it selects each policy (albeit not a deterministic policy) from
some distribution before the game and commits to it the whole game.
Algorithm 1 FPEM
Input: number of maximum base policies T , base policy setBP , opponent poolOP , a reservoir
memory M , policy selector network W and target network W ′
Output: policy selector W and corresponding base policies
1: for iteration t = 1 : T do
2: for i ∈ players[N ] do
3: initialize a new piit
4: for e in n episodes do
5: if i is max player then
6: pi−i ∼ Unif(OP ) (random if empty)
7: else
8:
pi−i =
{
pi−it w.p. 1/t
W ′ ◦ pi−i1:t−1 w.p. 1− 1/t
9: end if
10: play the game and collect trajectories
11: if i is min player and t ≥ 2 then
12: store (h, j) in M (j is the index of the policy executed at h)
13: end if
14: if e == 0 mod (learning frequency) then
15: update ωt with SGD on loss
E(h,j)∼M [− logW (h, j|ωt)]
16: optimize piit with collected transitions by RL algorithm
17: end if
18: end for
19: BP ← BP ∪ piit (or OP ← OP ∪ piit)
20: end for
21: set W ′ = W
22: end for
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3.3 Fictitious Play with Expanding Models
Instead of constantly updating a single policy model in the max step, we use an expanding
model approach that continually generates new policies and combines all of them. The new
policy model is named fictitious play with expanding models (FPEM), and consists of a base
policy set BP and a policy selector W : H → [0, 1]|BP |. FPEM is initialized with an empty
base policy set, and the selector W has no options. After every max step, a newly trained base
policy piit is added to BP , and thus W has a new optional policy. Only the parameters of current
training base policy piit and W are updated, and the previously trained base policies keep fixed
(if there are). During the min player’s step, the max player sample a policy from the base policy
set follow a specified distribution (e.g., uniform distribution) at the begining of each game, and
the experience pair (h, j) is stored in memory M , where h is the history and j is the index of
base policy executed at that history. W then learns from the stored experiences. To learn the
policy selector with limited experiences, reservoir sampling (Vitter, 1985) is used to store these
experiences from those best response policies. LetW be a neural network and parameterized by
ω; using W ◦ pii1:t denotes the FPEM model, i.e., the combined policy selector and base policy
set {pii1, pii2, · · · , piit}. Thus the objective of FPEM is
ωt = argmin
ω
E(h,j)∼M [− logW (h, j|ω)] (4)
θit = argmax
θi
V (pi
i
t,pi
−i),i(h), (5)
, where θit represents the parameters of the base policy pi
i
t. Since we aim at solving for the max
player’s policy, thus we use FPEM as the max player’s policy model and intentionally use the
opponent pool for the min player for simplicity. In fact, both players can adopt FPEM as their
policy model. Figure 1 shows both the process of policy generating in FPEM and the opponent’s
policy generating with the opponent pool.
We make policy selector W a behavior strategy that selects a base policy at every action
history, and mix these base policies in the behavior strategy level. W and piit are trained while
parameters of pii1:t−1 are not updated, which is a trade-off between the stability and adaptabil-
ity. Keeping and incorporating previously trained base policies will overcome the catastrophic
forgetting problem, which helps stabilize training. Besides, adding a new base policy and re-
training the policy selector W will improve the adaptability of FPEM since the new base policy
serves as a sub-model to make FPEM adapt to the newly updated opponent pool.
The learning of average policy in FSP or NFSP is a policy distillation process, where the
average policy constantly learns from the inputs and outputs of best response models. FPEM
explicitly expands with these best response models and form a hierarchical structure, which
potentially improves learning efficiency. Another potential advantage is that using a behavior
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strategy rather than a mixed strategy can improve the robustness when evaluation with finite
simulations. Although there is an equivalence relationship between a mixed strategy and a cor-
responding behavior strategy given perfect recall, they will receive the same cumulative reward
only in expectation. A single base policy is trained against a specified opponent, so it may not
be that reasonable in all states. However, FPEM integrates all these base policies and makes
decisions in every history so that multiple policies work jointly during one episode.
The process of FPEM is summarized in Algorithm 1. The max player (take player 1 as max
player) trains a best response pi11 to the opponent and adds it to base policy set BP . The min
player trains a best response pi21 against pi
1
1 . In iteration 2, the max player trains pi
1
2 and adds it
to BP; the min player trains pi22 against pi
1
1, pi
1
2 with equal probability and W learns from (h, j)
pairs, where j is the index of the base policy executed at the history state h. At the end of this
iteration, the target network W ′ is replaced by W so that in the next iteration, W ′ combined
with pi11, pi
1
2 (denoted by W
′ ◦ pi11:2) is a uniform mixture of trained policies. In iteration 3, the
min player trains against W ′ ◦ pi11:2 and pi13 with probabilities 2/3, 1/3, respectively, which is
equivalent to competing with pi11, pi
1
2, pi
1
3 with equal probabilities. New (h, j) pairs are stored
in the reservoir memory and W retrains. Since each W is an approximation of the specified
distribution (e.g., uniform distribution) over pi11:t−1 and retrains to incorporate the newly trained
pi1t , FPEM maintains the specified mixture in behavior form.
Notice that in 1, the uniform distribution version of FPEM is described, but FPEM is not
restricted to uniform distribution. In fact, the policy selector can learn from any proper distribu-
tion. In this paper, we mainly focus on uniform distribution.
The latest base policy of both players always learns a best response to the opponent pool,
so the FPEM potentially enjoys the convergence property in two-player zero-sum games, as it
tracks the process of fictitious play. The above implies that if FPEM converges in a two-player
zero-sum game, then it converges to a Nash equilibrium, which is also a maximin strategy.
In the experiments, we also evaluate a non-alternating learning variant of FPEM (FPEMv1),
where each player updates his policy model simultaneously. Learning a new best response and
playing with a combination of other models and the current learning model, the simultaneous
learning process leads to a off-policy problem. So for the simultaneous learning version, we use
off-policy RL algorithms or apply a clipped importance sampling weight on the critic (value
funtion).
4 Experiments
The proposed FPEM is first evaluated in Kuhn poker as a case study and then two stochastic
games. Kuhn poker is an extensive-form imperfect-information game. The two stochastic games
are a two-player zero-sum treasure hunting environments and Mini-RTS from ELF platform
10
(a) Map1 (b) Map2 (c) Field of View
Figure 2: Visualization of two initialized Treasure Hunting maps and the field of view of a
player. In (a) and (b), players are represented with a diamond (max player) and a circle (min
player). The movable areas are denoted by hollow grey squares, and solid black squares are
walls that block players. Treasures are denoted by red stars and randomly spawned in an empty
grid. (c) shows the field of view of one player. It is a diamond-shaped area with a maximum
of 13 grids, and player locates in the central grid. This area shrinks when the player is near the
boundary.
(Tian et al., 2017). We also note that the last two games are symmetric, i.e., for any permutation
of players, the policy space and the reward for that player will not change, while Kuhn is not
symmetric. So for symmetric games, we only use FPEM as the max player’s policy model and
maintain a pool for the opponent, and after training, only FPEM is evaluated. For unsymmetric
games, FPEM models are used for all the players.
4.1 Case Study: On Kuhn Poker
Two-player Kuhn poker is a toy poker game with 3 totally-ordered cards, where each player
starts with a private card and assigned 2 chips for one game and antes 1 chips to play. Players
can choose to bet, check or fold and the betting is limited to 1. The game ends with a showdown
or one player folds.
NashConv(pi) =
∑N
i maxpii,′ V
i(pii,′, pi−i) − V i(pii, pi−i) is commonly used in poker AI,
which measures how much players gain by unilaterally switching to a best response. It also
measures the distance from a Nash equilibrium, where a NashConv value of δ yields a δ-Nash
equilbrium. This measure can easily be obtained in Kuhn poker. The reason for choosing Kuhn
poker because there is a transition dynamics yet simple enough to get a close-form measure
rather than caring for the poker game.
To verify the expanding models, we compare FPEM with original NFSP and based on the
open-source library OpenSpiel (Lanctot et al., 2019). In FPEM, each expanded model is a deep
Q-nets (DQN). After some episodes of best response learning, this policy stops learning, and
a new base policy begins to learn. Once the second base policy begins to learn (the second
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outer iteration), the policy selector W learns the mixture at each state, which is equivalent
to the uniform distribution over all the trained base policies. Because DQN is an off-policy
RL algorithm, the experiences from previous trained models can be put into the replay buffer.
Thus the implementation of FPEM mainly differs from NFSP in that the average strategy is
expanding with newly trained models. Since the evaluation with NashConv requires a behavior
strategy rather than a pool of trained best response, RSPO is not compared currently.
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Figure 3: NashConv in 2-player Kuhn poker.
For NFSP, the anticipator η = 0.1 and the two policy networks are both 1-layer MLP with
64 units, which are the same as the original paper (varying hidden units seems to make little
difference). For FPEM, the policy selector W is also a 1-layer MLP with 64 hidden units.
During the learning process of W , the target selector network W ′ is also used to maintain the
distribution over t−1 base policies, and current learning base policy is executed with probability
1
t
. So, at the begining of one game, with probability 1− 1
t
, the target selector W ′ with t−1 base
policies is chosen to follow for a game, and the new base policy is chosen with probability 1
t
.
W ′ is update by W at the end of an iteration. The number of maximum base policies is set to
40. Each base policy learns for 5× 104 episodes.
Figure 3 shows that with expanding models, the average policy is faster to achieve a lower
NashConv. In the first 0.05M episodes, the NashConv is directly from the -greedy(Q) policies.
After that, the NashConv is calculated from the training average policy (multiple -greedy(Q)
in behavior level), in corresponding with NFSP. After a long-term training, the NashConv of
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both algorithm reachs to a very low value. Because adding too many sub-models requires more
samples and complex network architectures for the policy selector to learn, we do not run FPEM
with more than 50 base policies. With multiple runs, the final NashConv of NFSP in Kuhn poker
seems to plateau at 0.03± 0.05 after 10M episodes, while FPEM only reaches 0.08± 0.03 with
maximum of 5M episodes, thus FPEM learns faster than NFSP with limited samples. Possibly
due to the stochastic nature of poker, and DQN is a deterministic sub-model, it requires more
samples or hyper-parameter searchs for FPEM to achieve a better performance in the long run.
4.2 On Stochastic Games
In the latter two environments, due to the long horizon and sparse reward properties, we use
policy-gradient based RL approaches and stack the last K frames to approximate history ht. In
treasure hunting, PPO (Schulman et al., 2017) is the solver for best response and A3C (Mnih
et al., 2016) for Mini-RTS. However, FPEM is not coupled with PPO, A3C, and any other
efficient solvers can be used. As reported in (Kawamura and Tsuruoka, 2019) and the original
ELF paper, A3C implemented by the ELF platform slightly outperforms PPO against two built-
in AIs.
4.3 Environment Description
Treasure Hunting The treasure hunting game happens in an 8 × 8 grid world. With ran-
domly generated obstacles in the grid, each player is able to receive a partial observation of
the environment, which is a diamond-shaped area. Fig 2 two randomly initialized map and the
observable areas. The available actions for each player are {UP, DOWN, LEFT, RIGHT}. A
player will be rewarded 1 if he obtains a treasure, and the opponent receives a reward -1 at the
same time. If the player who has owned a treasure gains a second one, he receives a reward 2,
and -2 for the opponent. When two players gain a treasure simultaneously, both will receive a
reward 0, and this treasure disappears in the map. A grab occurs when one player who carries a
treasure enters the same grid with the opponent, then the treasure loses to the opponent and the
reward will be -2. An episode usually lasts for 60-80 ticks and with a maximum of 100 ticks.
Each player will only receive the reward signal when the player gains or loses a treasure.
Mini-RTS Mini-RTS is a partially observable two-player zero-sum game environment on
the ELF platform. It is a miniature custom-made RTS game that captures all the underlying dy-
namics of StarCraft (fog-of-war, resource gathering, troop building, defence/attack with troops,
etc.). The observation is composed of spatially structured (20-by-20) abstractions of the current
game environment with 22 channels. Although Mini-RTS offers micro-commands, the actions
used in the experiments are nine strategic hard-coded global commands. Every game terminates
at a maximum of 30000 ticks (an average game lasts for 1000-6000 ticks). There are two rule-
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based built-AIs named SIMPLE and Hit-aNd-Run (HNR) respectively (a human player has a
win rate of 90% and 50% against SIMPLE and HNR in 20 games).
Table 1: Winning rate against adversary in Mini-RTS.
Model OP1 (%) OP2 (%) OP3 (%) OP4 (%) OP5 (%) OP6 (%) OP7 (%) OP8 (%) OP9 (%) OP10 (%)
FPEM 49.6±1.6 49.9±1.3 50.2±1.4 51.0±1.0 50.8±1.1 50.4±1.4 50.7±1.2 50.7±1.8 51.0±0.2 50.5±1.2
FPEMv1 50.3±1.7 51.2±1.4 51.8±1.2 52.6±1.1 52.5±0.9 50.8±1.3 50.2±1.6 51.2±0.7 50.9±1.1 50.3±1.5
SMv1 49.5±0.2 49.8±0.3 50.2±0.4 50.4±0.4 50.1±0.3 49.8±0.4 50.3±0.4 50.1±0.3 49.7±0.5 50.5±0.4
SMv2 49.2±1.5 48.6±1.6 48.1±1.5 48.5±1.5 47.8±1.5 49.2±1.2 48.9±1.3 48.5±1.6 48.6±1.2 48.2±0.5
OPPO 49.6±1.2 50.6±1.3 49.8±1.5 50.2±1.4 50.4±1.3 49.9±1.4 50.1±1.3 49.9±1.1 50.2±1.1 49.7±1.4
4.4 Experimental Settings
In the treasure hunting experiment, the base policies of two players are both 4-layer MLP. The
policy selector W is a 4-layer MLP. For a single model policy, a 5-layer MLP is used. ReLu
is the nonlinear activation function in all MLPs. The player who has the higher return wins in
a game, and ties with the opponent only when both players’ returns are 0. In each max or min
step, it alternates to train a new base policy when
{] of win− ] of lose}
] of episodes
> δt, (6)
or 100K episodes are reached. (6) is computed using the most recent 6K episodes. δt is set to
0.2.
In Mini-RTS, the base policy model is a simple CNN which is the same as (Tian et al.,
2017), with two heads for the policy and the critic respectively. W shares the CNN parameters
with base policy and connected by one FC layer. Every base policy learns for 300K episodes.
The number of maximum base policies is 10 in both environments.
4.5 Results and Analysis
For both experiments, we save the trained model after each iteration and evaluate these saved
policy models. We evaulate on 3 seeds for both experiments. Unlike Kuhn poker, there is no
such closed-form measure of NashConv, so the metric we use is how much a trained policy
model loses against a trained malicious opponent, which measures how much a policy can be
exploited.
In treasure hunting, the FPEM, FPEMv1 are compared with five other approaches. Since
we aim to solve for the policy of the max player, only the max player is evaluated. Note that
both games are symmetric, the players are homogeneous, so the evaluation of the max player is
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enough. Besides, all of the policy models are initialized with pre-trained models via self-play, at
a fraction of episodes used in one iteration to facilitate early-stage learning. SMv1 is the alterna-
tive optimization approach, where each player uses a single model. SMv2 is a variant of SMv1,
where the min player is replaced by an opponent pool with a maximum of 10 base policies. Each
base policy in the pool is a best response to the max player’s corresponding policy. NFSP uses
the same network structure as in SMv1, except there is another average policy, and both players
learn simultaneously. The anticipatory parameter η in NFSP is 0.25 which performs best among
{0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.5}. In the OPPO, both players use the uniform opponent pool. For PSRO, each
item of the expected utility tensor is computed via 10K simulations, and the meta-strategy is
solved by regret matching (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000), as it is comparable to PRD solver in
PSRO and straight-forward to implement. Besides, the same exploratory strategies for PSRO
are used as in (Lanctot et al., 2017).
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Figure 4: Average losses against malicious adversaries in Treasure Hunting. The loss is com-
puted by playing against retrained adversaries, and each point is the average loss tested using
2× 104 episodes.
For each model, we retrain 10 models with a 4-layer MLP to approximate the malicious
adversaries, and these adversaries are trained until the expected return plateaus or a maximum
of 300K episodes are reached. Figure 4 demonstrates that SMv2, FPEM and FPEMv1 are less
exploited when the opponent pool increases and the FPEM is slightly better than the other two.
The shaded areas denote the average losses with the standard deviation from 3 runs. SMv1 fluc-
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tuates as training proceeds since it may forget how to respond to old opponents. And due to the
deeper networs, SMv1 seems to comparable with SMv2. Although NFSP does not fluctuate and
is with an extremely low variance, it appears to learn slowly. In the OPPO, due to sampling a
base policy to follow for a whole game, the mixture of the pool is vulnerable. The overall per-
formance of PSRO is better than the uniform version PSRO (OPPO), but may still be restricted
by the accuracy of the expected utility tensor, where 10K simulations may be insufficient to get
a good approximation. However, 10K simulations on each item are the trade-off between the
time costs and the accuracy. Moreover, the average losses of FPEM decrease, thus the policy
loses less and less against the malicious opponents and approximates the maximin strategy.
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Figure 5: Average winning rates against different built-in AIs in Mini-RTS. Each point is tested
using 2× 104 episodes.
In Mini-RTS, only OPPO, SMv1 and SMv2 are compared with FPEM. Having noticed that
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the two players are homogeneous and use the same policy model in SMv1 and OPPO, these
two approaches are trained through self-play, where both players share the model parameters
and play against itself. NFSP is omitted due to the slow convergence in treasure hunting, and
from (Kawamura and Tsuruoka, 2019), NFSP falls behind self-play, where the implementation
of SMv1 essentially is equivalent to raw self-play in that work. The PSRO is not completely
conducted since it spends too much time on computing the expected utility tensor and can not
get the Nash distribution. All of the evaluated approaches are trained without built-AIs and
make a decision every 50 ticks, and the base policies are initialized by a pre-trained model
through self-play for 40K episodes. The results against trained adversaries are shown in Table
1. Each adversary is the corresponding opponent’s policy at the end of each min iteration and is
evaluated for 2×104 episodes and the standard deviation is calculated from the results of 3 runs.
Since SMv1 and OPPO are totally self-play, the average winning rates is around 50%, however,
SMv1 achieves a lower standard deviation. So a behavior policy performs more stably. Besides,
FPEM, FPEMv1 have a higher overall winning rates against the adversaries.
To further evaluate the performance of FPEM, all the trained models play against two built-
in AIs with different configurations: with decision frequencies 50 and 10 ticks (the latter one is
tougher). Since the built-in AIs do not learn to adapt, a policy againt a same AI should defeat it
once and for all. However, from the results against built-in AIs in Figure 5, all non-expanding
models have notable drops when playing against the same AIs as the training proceeds, except
FPEM and FPEMv1. That is, without expanding models or a behavior policy, the policy is
easy to forget how to respond to old opponents. The shaded areas denote the average winning
rates with the standard deviation from 3 runs. Besides, we let FPEMv1 compete with the three
approaches, where each match consists of 2×104 episodes and only the final models are tested.
FPEMv1 defeats OPPO, SMv1, SMv2 with winning rates of 53.5%, 51.9%, 52.2%, with a
maximum deviation of 0.5% respectively.
So, with expanding modes and the behavior-form policy, FPEM is significantly more robust
against various opponents, with little or even without a sudden winning rate drop as the number
of base policies increases.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose fictitious play reinforcement learning with expanding models (FPEM)
that consists of multiple sub-models (base policies) and can be used as a behavior policy. The
proposed method is scalable with a fixed number of base policies, which alliviates the forgetting
problem and can improve the learning efficiency. Since the uniform version of FPEM tracks the
process of fictitious play, it enjoys the convergence property in two-player zero-sum games.
However, FPEM is not restricted to learn a uniform mixture over the sub-models, and any other
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distribution can be used. Experimental results on different kinds of domains demonstrate that
the learned FPEM model does not forget how to respond to old opponents and is harder to be
exploited by malicious opponents, compared to NFSP or a pool of policies.
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